Documentation Index
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Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
Summary
This note gathers official source inputs for contributors writing about local agent systems: agents that work near a user’s files, tools, project state, and workflow instructions rather than operating only as a remote chat surface. Use it when a draft needs to explain what “local” actually means. The durable pattern is not the location of one model. It is the combination of:- an execution environment or local tool boundary
- reusable skill or workflow packaging
- explicit filesystem or document scope
- resources that can be selected, searched, read, or refreshed
- permission rules that make the boundary understandable to users
How To Use This Note
This is a source map, not a full article. Future contributors should use it to:- define the boundary before describing the agent
- choose the right source for the claim they are making
- keep local files, selected resources, skills, and connectors separate
- add case-study examples that show what the agent may read, write, and review
Why It Matters
Local-agent topics are becoming easy to overstate. A useful handbook treatment should separate several concerns that are often mixed together:runtime: where commands, scripts, files, or containers runskills: how reusable task knowledge is packagedroots: which local filesystem areas a tool-facing server may seeresources: which files, schemas, records, or application objects can be exposed as model contextconnectors: how local and remote services become callable tools
| Term | Reader question | Common mistake |
|---|---|---|
runtime | Where does the work execute? | Treating all agent work as a chat reply |
skills | What reusable task knowledge is packaged? | Hiding stale instructions inside one long prompt |
roots | Which filesystem boundaries are in scope? | Saying “file access” without naming the boundary |
resources | Which selected objects can become context? | Assuming every backend object is automatically available |
connectors | Which systems can be called as tools? | Treating integration access as permission to use all data |
Scope Notes
Included:- official OpenAI source material on Responses API tools, file search, remote MCP support, and computer environments
- official OpenAI, Claude Code, and MCP security guidance on prompt injection, sandboxing, and trust boundaries for local agents
- official MCP material on roots and resources
- official Claude Code material on local stdio servers, project/user scopes, and MCP resources
- third-party MCP server listings
- unofficial prompt-injection commentary
- vendor comparisons that do not change the handbook’s local-agent mental model
- implementation details for a production email or CRM integration
Source Map
- OpenAI Responses API tools and remote MCP support: use this for claims about hosted tools, remote MCP support, file search, and long-running background work.
- OpenAI computer environment for agents: use this for claims about execution environments, persistent files, shell access, compaction, and agent skills as runtime support.
- Designing AI agents to resist prompt injection: use this when the draft needs a current OpenAI framing for source-sink analysis, user confirmation, and constraining what untrusted content can cause an agent to do.
- MCP introduction: use this for a stable, high-level explanation of MCP as a connection layer between AI applications and external systems.
- MCP roots: use this when the draft needs to explain local filesystem boundaries.
- MCP resources: use this when the draft needs to explain application-controlled context surfaces such as files, schemas, or application-specific objects.
- Claude Code MCP documentation: use this as a practical example of local stdio servers, project-scoped MCP configuration, plugin-provided servers, and resources in a coding-agent workflow.
- Claude Code security: use this for permission checks, trust verification for MCP servers, and practical guidance for working with untrusted content.
- Claude Code sandboxing: use this for claims about filesystem and network isolation that limit damage if prompt injection succeeds.
- MCP security best practices: use this when the draft needs concrete language for local MCP server compromise, one-click startup-command consent, scope minimization, and why stdio or authenticated transports matter.
- promptfoo/promptfoo: use this as a high-signal implementation repo for red-teaming and CI-level prompt-injection checks around agents, tools, and RAG systems.
Synthesis
The strongest local-agent spine is a layered one:- The user or host application chooses an operating boundary.
- Tools and servers expose capabilities inside that boundary.
- Resources and roots describe which context can be read or selected.
- Skills package repeatable task knowledge.
- The agent produces an artifact or action that can be reviewed.
Production-Readiness Note
The current seven-day signal around prompt injection is a reminder that local agents should be described as authority systems, not just capability systems. The practical question is not only “what can the agent read?” It is “what authority travels with that input once the agent can call tools, touch files, or send data elsewhere?”- Treat retrieved files, web pages, emails, and connector output as untrusted content unless a reviewed policy says otherwise.
- Separate source from sink: untrusted content may inform the agent, but sensitive tool calls, credential use, and outbound transmissions should stay behind extra approval, sandboxing, or both.
- Verify every MCP server before connecting it. Prefer explicit scope choice,
exact startup-command review, and
stdioor authenticated transports for local servers. - Keep human confirmation in the write path for consequential actions such as sending messages, changing tickets, or moving data to third-party systems.
- Add prompt-injection and tool-misuse checks to eval or red-team workflows before calling a local-agent setup production-ready.
Case-Study Hooks
Good local-agent case studies should make the boundary visible:- customer-support email agent: inbound message path plus local policy document path
- coding agent: repository root plus issue, test, and branch permissions
- operations agent: dashboard or database resource plus read-only query rules
- research agent: source folder plus citation artifact output
Gaps And Follow-up
- Add a small matrix comparing direct local scripts, local stdio MCP servers, remote MCP servers, and platform-hosted tools.
- Expand the customer-support case study once the starter code includes a real mailbox or Gmail adapter.
- Add a future starter or case-study note showing how source-aware authority enforcement or prompt-injection red-teaming fits into a local-agent workflow.
Update Log
- 2026-05-17: Added prompt-injection, sandboxing, trust-boundary, and red-teaming guidance to the local-agent source map.
- 2026-04-24: Refined the note for contributor comprehension with usage guidance, term boundaries, and clearer source-to-claim mapping.
- 2026-04-23: Added a contributor-facing source map for local agent tooling, skills, roots, resources, and file-grounded workflows.
